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The project of giving an account of meaning in natural languages goes largely by
assigning truth-conditional content to sentences. I will call the view that sentences
have truth-conditional content propositionalism as it is common to identify the
truth-conditional content of a sentence with the proposition it expresses. This
content plays an important role in our explanations of the speech-acts, attitude
ascriptions, and the meaning of sentences when they appear as parts of longer sen-
tences. Much work in philosophy of language and linguistics semantics over the
last half-century has aimed to characterize the truth-conditional content of di↵erent
aspects of language.
There are di↵erent kinds of worries one might have about this project. There are
general methodological worries about truth-conditional semantics that have had
some currency in the philosophical literature. In my view, the enormous progress
in semantics made in its brief history suggests these are misplaced. However, many
sympathetic to the general project of truth-conditional semantics have argued that
specific constructions are not themselves amenable to assignment of propositional
content. Conditionals, ‘if . . . then . . . ’ constructions, have been one of the most
⇤I am grateful to Justin Khoo and Seth Yalcin for discussion.
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prominent such examples. My goal here is to take stock of the current debate over
the status of conditionals with respect to propositionalism.
Some disclaimers. For the most part, I will focus on indicative conditionals rather
than subjunctive or counterfactual ones. I will not explore in detail any of the non-
propositional accounts of conditionals, rather I will mostly look at the challenges
to propostionalism about conditionals that might motivate these accounts. This
strategy suggests a kind of conservative view that we should stick with propositions
when possible. I am sympathetic to this view, but do not want to justify it here.
2 Propositions in semantics
Before discussing the particular challenge conditionals raise, we need to clarify the
commitments of proppositionalism. The dominant paradigm in semantics, truth-
conditional semantics, associates declarative sentences with satisfaction conditions,
i.e. the situations in which they are true [Montague, 1973, Lewis, 1970, Heim and
Kratzer, 1998].
Formally, we think of a sentence (in a context) as determining a mapping from worlds
to truth-values. I do not want to go so far as to identify the semantic value of a
sentence with such a mapping, or equivalently, a set of possible worlds. There are
two reasons not to equate these semantic values with such objects. First, as Lewis
[1980] persuasively argues, the semantic value of a sentence must be something more
complex then simply a set of possible worlds. This is because an adequate treatment
of the embedding of sentences under operators (such as modal or temporal operators)
requires assigning semantic values to sentences that are functions from times and
worlds and other indices to propositions.1 Second, I do not want to rule out the
possibility that sentences determine something more fine-grained than a set of truth-
conditions, such as a structured proposition [as in e.g. Salmon, 1986, Soames, 1985].
To be more concrete, take a sentence such as ‘Johnny is in the basement’. Associated
with this sentence (in a context) is a mapping from worlds to truth-values that
1While there has been some controversy over this claim, recent work has strengthened the case
for disassociating sentential semantic values from the propositional content of a sentence [Ninan,
forthcoming, Rabern, 2012].
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returns true if and only if Johnny is in the (contextually relevant) basement. When
you assert this sentence, something you do is put forward this proposition. When
the sentence is embedded in a belief report such as, ‘Bill thinks Johnny is in the
basement’, the belief attributed to Bill is in this proposition. These are the basic
tenants of propositionalism, and as I said, for simple sentences like ‘Johnny is in the
basement’ they are uncontroversial.2
The question about conditionals is whether this story can be extended to conditional
sentences sentences such as ‘if Bill is in China, then Ted is in Japan’. That is, does
a sentence like this have associated with it a mapping from world to truth-values
that plays the role in belief and assertion outlined above? In the next few sections,
I’ll bring out a number of challenges to this thesis.
3 Material conditional
It will be useful to review briefly some problems with the most straightforward way
of vindicating propsitionalism: the material conditional account of conditionals,
according to which ‘if A then C’ is just equivalent to the disjunction of the negation
of A and C.
The inadequacy of this account is now widely accepted. It is not very di cult to
see that there is a major semantic di↵erence between ‘if A then C’ and ‘either not
A or C’. Here are a number of related considerations showing this di↵erence. First,
consider a case in which A is false: ‘either not A or C’ seems to be clearly true in this
case, but it is much less clear that ‘if A then C’ is true. Second, consider evidence
that A is false. This is clearly evidence for the disjunction ‘either not A or C’, but
it is not evidence for ‘if A then C’. Third, it seems that the probability of ‘either
not A or C’ cannot be lower than the probability that A is false. On the other
hand, it seems that the probability that ‘if A then C’ can be arbitrarily low even
2I do not even consider the dynamic tradition of Heim [1982] and Kamp [1981] to represent
a very serious departure from propositionalism. While it is true that certain uses of indefinite
descriptions do not have just propositional content, there are still, in most cases, easily recoverable
propositions expressed in these semantic systems. However, I do think dynamic test semantics
[Veltman, 1996] is a non-propositionalist theory. Regardless there is not a clear all-or-nothing
distinction here.
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when the probability that A is false is high—consider for instance the probability of
statement ‘if the world ends tomorrow, it will end at precisely 3:03pm’.3 All these
di↵erences suggest that the proposition expressed by a conditional, if any, is not the
material conditional.
There have been attempts to rescue the material conditional view with a pragmatic
story, either by explaining the di↵erence between natural language conditionals and
the material conditional by means of conversational or conventional implicatures
[Grice, 1967/1989, Jackson, 1987]. The former strategy has seemed to most un-
workable: there is no plausible conversational implicature which would bridge the
gap between the material conditional and the natural language conditional. The
latter strategy requires so divorcing the meaning of conditionals from their use in
communication that it is unclear what role the meaning (the material conditional)
has left to play. We will take for granted, then, that natural language conditionals
are not material conditionals.
4 Inference arguments
The failure of the material conditional analysis of conditionals itself is the first step in
a set of powerful arguments against propositionalism generally. These arguments go
by raising considerations that indicate that the material conditional view of natural
language conditionals is the only propositional view that captures crucial logical
properties of conditionals. If this is right, then propositionalism is doomed since the
material conditional view is untenable.
These arguments, first of all, generally take for granted that if conditionals express
propositions they express propositions that are at least as strong as the material
conditional. A simple argument for this assumption can be made on the basis of
the validity of modus ponens. If A is true and C is false then it seems that ‘if A
then C’ must be false. If this were not the case, then modus ponens would not be
a universally valid inference.4
3I base all these claims not just on widely-held intuitions about cases, but also on empirical
studies [see, e.g., Evans et al., 2003].
4However, note that there are some challenges to modus ponens in the literature: such as
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As Stalnaker [1975] notes, if we go the other direction and accept the inference from
‘not A or C’ to ‘if A then C’, the or-to-if inference, then we have accepted that
the truth-conditions of the indicative conditional exactly match that of the material
conditional. The or-to-if inference, moreover, seems intuitively plausible.5
There is a more complex argument, along these same lines, due to Gibbard [1981].6
As well as assuming that that natural language conditionals entail the material
conditional, Gibbard assumes the following two plausible principles:
import/export ‘if A then (if B then C)’ i↵ ‘if A and B then C’
consequence A |= C   ‘if A then C’
Gibbard shows that these two principles, plus the entailment of the material con-
ditional by the natural language conditional su ce to show that that the natural
language conditional is logically equivalent to the material conditional. conse-
quence seems uncontroversial: whenever C follows logically from A then ‘if A then
C’ is true. Likewise, import/export has been widely endorsed [e.g. McGee, 1985]
and seems intuitively valid. So, Gibbard’s proof forms the basis of an argument for
the material conditional capturing the truth conditions of conditionals, and, hence,
an argument against propositionalism.
5 Probability arguments
Earlier we saw that the probability of the conditional ‘if A then C’ does not corre-
spond to the probability of the material conditional ‘either ¬A or C’. It has long
been observed that the probability of a given conditional, in fact, always seems to
be the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. Thus, the
following equation, often referred to as Adams’ Thesis, Stalnaker’s Thesis or
just The Equation, p(‘if A then C’) = p(C|A) is taken to govern the probability of
McGee’s [1985] much discussed case, and, in the more recent literature, more subtle cases have
arisen [Kolodny and MacFarlane, 2010, Khoo, 2012].
5However, more recently, Stalnaker [2011] has given a case which he takes to be a counterex-
ample to the inference.
6See also Gillies [2009], Kratzer [2012], Khoo [2012] for further discussion.
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conditionals [Stalnaker, 1970, Adams, 1975]. The plausibility of Adams’ thesis is
easily confirmed by thinking about particular examples, and it has been empirically
tested [Evans et al., 2003].
Once we acceptAdams’ thesis we get into trouble almost immediately. There are a
wide range of technical results that show that Adams’ thesis when combined with
other plausible assumptions leads to paradoxical conclusion. Lewis’s [1976, 1986]
celebrated triviality theorems are the first and best known results, and there have
been many extensions.7 Adams, Edgington, Bennett [2003] and others have argued
that the culprit here is propositionalism. They think that it is the very assumption
that conditionals express propositions that have probabilities at all which leads to
the problematic results. Thus, they suggest we should endorse Adams’ thesis, but
deny propositionalism.
6 Gibbardian stando↵s
Another prominent argument against a propositional view of indicative conditionals
comes (again) form Gibard’s [1981] seminal article [see also Gillies, 2009, Kratzer,
2012, Khoo, 2012, for discussion]. Take a variant on Gibbard’s [1981] Sly Pete
example. Suppose three people know that a coin may or may not be flipped at
noon. Alfred is told ahead of time that if it lands head he will be told that within
a minute of it being flipped. Bob is told ahead of time that if it lands tails he will
be told that within a minute of it being flipped. Catherine gets no information,
but both Alfred and Bob are allowed to pass a note to Catherine. Suppose neither
Alfred nor Bob has heard anything about the coin flip at 12:01. Alfred passes a
note to Catherine that says, ‘If it was flipped, it landed tails.’ Bob passes a note
to Catherine that says, ‘If it was flipped, it didn’t land tails’. Catherine concludes
that it wasn’t flipped.
My preferred way of looking at this sort of Gibbardian stando↵ case is that it forces
us to abandon one of the following three plausible assumptions:
7See Edgington [1995] and Hajek and Hall [1994] for an overview. Cozic and E´gre´ [2010] make
an important connection between the triviality results and the limitations of unary quantification.
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incompatibility The propositions expressed by ‘if it flipped it landed heads’ and
‘if it flipped it landed tails’ in a single context cannot both be
true .
publicity An act of successful communication requires the proposition in
context asserted to be determinable by the hearer (and the case
above is one of successful communication).
non-subjectivism The identity of the speaker does not play any semantic role in
the proposition expressed by a conditional in these cases (i.e.
the note from Alfred could have meant the same thing if it had
been written by Bob).
The material conditional account rejects incompatibility, as both ‘if A then C’
and ‘if A then ¬C’ are true when A is false. However, it seems intuitively clear
that a single speaker in a single context cannot assert both ‘if A then C’ and ‘if A
then not C’. So, incompatibility is prima facie plausible. In the scenario the only
publicly observable piece of context that di↵ers for the two statements is the identity
of the speaker. If only publicly observable pieces of context matter (publicity) and
the identity of the speaker doesn’t matter (non-subjectivism) then the context is
the same for the two utterances. But then the two notes cannot both be true, by
incompatibility. Nonetheless it seems that in this situation both notes are true.
Moreover, it seems hard to argue that this situation does not contain two standard
successful communicative acts. I take both publicity and non-subjectivism to
be plausible assumptions.
7 Propositionalism defended
We have seen a battery of arguments against the tenability of propositionalism about
conditionals. Here I will outline a way in which propositionalism can be defended.
A good place to start is with a response to Gibbardian stando↵s due to Kratzer
[1986]. Kratzer essentially argues that in each case the conditional is a strict con-
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ditional with a modal base being the knowledge of the speaker. Kratzer denies
subjectivism about indicative conditionals. She writes (about Gibbard’s case):
. . . these particular indicative conditionals behave like indexicals: They
are interpreted with respect to the evidence available to their utterers.
But this means they are implicitly modalized.
What she means is that each conditional expresses a conditional necessity about the
evidence available to the speaker. So Alfred’s utterance of ‘if it was flipped it landed
tails’ is true if and only if in all situations compatible with Alfred’s evidence in which
the coin was flipped it landed tails, and Bob’s utterance of ‘if it was flipped it didn’t
land tails’ simply means that in all situations compatible with Bob’s evidence in
which it was flipped it landed didn’t land tails.8 If Catherine learns that both these
statements are true, then she can rule out the possibility that the coin was flipped.
Do indicative conditionals really express claims about our evidence or knowledge?
That is, can we deny non-subjectivism? Some see non-subjectivism as ap-
pealing. One argument goes as follows: if conditionals expressed propositions about
one’s evidence or knowledge, then believing a conditional would seem to require
having a belief about one’s own knowledge or evidence. But it is possible (and in
the case of non-human animals routine) to believe a conditional without having any
beliefs about one’s knowledge or evidence. Hence, non-subjectivism. Here we
enter into similar territory to that explored in recent debates over the meaning of
epistemic modals such as ‘might’ and ‘must’ [see, e.g., Yalcin, 2011]. The argument
about conditionals not seeming to be about knowledge or evidence may weigh in
favor of non-subjectivism, but it is not decisive.
Kratzer’s account of conditionals is structurally equivalent to the standard variably
strict semantics for conditionals developed by Lewis [1973] and Stalnaker [1968].9
Lewis, however, does not extend his account to indicative conditionals and Stalnaker
8It’s important to note that Kratzer explicitly argues that only certain conditionals are subjec-
tive in this respect: all are moralized for Kratzer but the modal base varies in di↵erent cases.
9Although Kratzer treats conditionals as strict her account of modals [Kratzer, 1981] makes
strict conditionals equivalent to variably strict ones [see Lewis, 1981, for details].
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says very little about the exact interpretation of indicative conditionals, focusing
rather on their basic logical properties.10
Even if we accept the basic plausibility of an epistemically-flavored strict conditional
view, there is still the question of how we answer the other challenges to proposition-
alism. With respect to the arguments discussed in section 4, it seems that the only
response is to deny that conditionals really have the entailments attributed to them
in these arguments. Stalnaker [1975] argues that his semantics for conditionals, with
a suitable pragmatic constraint, can explain the pragmatic validity of the or-to-if
inference. He argues, however, that the inference is not logically valid, so we do
not need to equate the natural language conditional with the material conditional.11
Gibbard’s proof that natural language conditionals are equivalent to material con-
ditionals based on import/export and consequence has received less attention,
but as we will see in the next section there may be a suitable response.
Perhaps the most serious challenge to propositionalism is the set of arguments about
conditionals and probability discussed in section 5. However, here too there are a
variety of ways in which proponents of propositionalism can respond. Rothschild
[2013] argues that a semantics like Kratzer’s or Stalnaker’s can predict both why
Adams’ thesis generally holds and why it fails in certain cases long recognized in
the literature [e.g. McGee, 2000], thus avoiding the problems raised by the Lewis’s
triviality proofs. On the empirical front, Douven and Verbrugge [2013] have sug-
gested that while Adams’ thesis might hold in simple cases, the generalization of
it necessary for the triviality proofs does not seem to be empirically valid. As things
stand, the status of the argument from probability against propositionalism is far
from clear.
The scorecard so far? There are responses to the arguments against propositionalism
about conditionals. However, there is clearly detailed work to be done in weighing
the plausibility of the full basket of responses needed. There is a serious worry about
propositionalism with respect to conditionals in way that there isn’t about many
10Though in later work Stalnaker [1984, 2011] elaborates more about what propositions, if any,
he thinks conditionals express.
11More recently, Stalnaker [2011] has even suggested that the inference is not always even prag-
matically valid.
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other classes of sentences (such as conjunctions and disjunctions). More generally, it
seems that conditionals are special; for one thing, we seem to have less access to their
logical properties than we seem to have to the logical properties of other natural
language expressions. Even the most basic properties like modus ponens [McGee,
1985] and modus tollens [Yalcin, 2012] have been challenged, while other alleged
properties like Adams’ thesis and import/export are more controversial. This
unclarity about the meaning of conditionals, however, is not itself a strong argument
against them expressing propositions.
As we will see in the next section, the case for propositionalism may be strength-
ened by detailed considered of the meaning of the word ‘if’ itself and the syntax of
conditionals.
8 The meaning of ‘if’
Regardless of the overall tenability of the propositional approach it needs to be
supplemented by a more serious syntactic/semantic analysis of the natural language
conditionals. So far, after all, we have just discussed the meaning of an individual
indicative conditional sentence considered in isolation, without respect to either how
it embeds under operators or how the individual parts of it go into making up the
meaning of the whole. This might seem a harmless abstraction, as the details of
the compositional semantics are not always relevant to our basic understanding of
the meaning of some classes of expressions. However, Kratzer [1981, 1986, 2012] has
forcefully argued that a picture of the meaning of ‘if’ clauses due to Lewis [1975]
has important ramifications for some of the issues discussed above.
Lewis’s basic idea is that ‘if’-clauses serve to restrict adverbs of quantification in
sentences like ‘Usually, if a man enters a bar, he orders a drink.’ We can understand
‘usually’ as a quantifier over situations which is then restricted by the ‘if’-clause ‘if
a man enters a bar’ to only quantify over situations in which a man enters a bar.
This basic account, as far as I know, is the only viable account of the embedding
of conditionals under adverbs of quantification.12 Kratzer, as well as Heim [1982],
12See Khoo [2011] for a discussion of the problems facing a dynamic account.
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expand Lewis’s semantics to cover both interactions between ‘if’-clauses and modal
operators, in such examples as ‘if John is here, he must be asleep.’ Furthermore,
Kratzer argues that even in bare conditionals, conditionals without any explicit
modal operators, there is silent modal necessity operator that is being restricted by
the antecedent. This explains Kratzer’s view above about the Gibbard stand-o↵
case: in this instance, there is a silent epistemic necessity modal in those uses.
Kratzer argues that her view allows for e↵ective responses to the existing challenges
to propositionalism. We have already seen her response to Gibbard’s stando↵ cases.
Most significantly her view allows for an explanation of the appearance that condi-
tionals obey Adams’ thesis. On her view, the embedding of conditionals under prob-
ability operators mirrors their embedding under adverbs of quantification [Kratzer,
1986, 2012, Cozic and E´gre´, 2010]. There is a slight wrinkle here. Kratzer’s account
gives a simple explanation of when a sentence like ‘There’s a 50 percent chance,
that if the coin is flipped, it will lands head’ is true. Her explanation is that the
antecedent ‘if the coin is flipped’ restricts the modal ‘there is a 50 percent chance’.
However, it is less clear how she explains why we judge the full sentence ‘if the coin
is flipped, it will lands head’ to have a 50 percent probability, since on her account
the full sentence should contain a hidden epistemic necessity modal [see von Fintel,
2007, Rothschild, 2013, to appear, Kratzer, 2012, for related discussion].
As for the arguments against propositionalism from the entailments of condition-
als: Since Kratzer embraces a strict-conditional view similar to Stalnaker’s for bare
conditionals she can help herself to his pragmatic explanation of the or-to-if in-
ference. The situation with import/export is more subtle. Kratzer [1986] claims
that her theory allows us her to validate import/export and consequence with-
out making conditionals equivalent to the material conditionals because she does not
endorse the view that the conditional is a two-place operator. However, Khoo [2012]
shows that Kratzer’s syntax does not itself allow her to escape Gibbard’s conclu-
sion. Nonetheless, Khoo argues that Kratzer can and should deny certain instances
of modus ponens to address this problem.
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9 The way we live now
Non-propositional views of indicative conditionals are widespread in the philosoph-
ical and linguistic literature. These views can be divided into two main camps: on
the one hand, views according to which conditionals do not express propositions
because they lack a semantic value in the normal sense, and on the other hand,
views according to which conditionals have semantic values but those values are not
themselves compatible with propositionalism (i.e. they do not determine a propo-
sition which is the content of the conditional in the normal sense). Adams [1975]
are Edgington [1995] generally considered to be in the first camp as they emphasize
the norms of assertion of conditionals without assigning any particular semantic
value to conditionals. These views face the challenge of relying on essentially ad
hoc accounts of the embedding of indicative conditionals in di↵erent environments.
Some such as Edgington [1995] and Gibbard [1981] have pointed to this as an ad-
vantage of their account as conditionals often do not felicitously embed under logical
operators. However, recent work has showed that there is systematic data about
the embeddings of conditionals, especially under quantifiers, which should be ex-
plained by a semantics of conditionals [von Fintel and Iatridou, 2002, Klinedinst,
2011, Rothschild, to appear].
There are, on the other hand, a variety of views that assign semantic values to
conditionals, but do not associate with them propositions in the usual sense. Three
examples of such views are dynamic ‘test’ semantics [Veltman, 1996, Gillies, 2004,
Willer, 2012], trivalent semantics [Belnap, 1970, Huitink, 2008, Rothschild, forth-
coming], and expressivist semantics [Yalcin, 2007]. There are also some harder to
classify theories, mostly designed to deal explicitly with the relationship between
conditionals and probability. For example, McGee [1989], Je↵rey and Stalnaker
[1994] and Bradley [2012] all give non-standard truth-conditions to conditionals to
account for the relationship between conditionals and probability in a way compat-
ible with Lewis’s triviality theorems and related results.
Given the obvious challenges to propositionalism it is important to have at hand vi-
able non-propositional accounts of the meaning of conditionals. However, it remains
an open question whether we ultimately need a non-propositional account of natural
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language conditionals. This question is not going to be settled by reference only to
the classic arguments against propositionalism sketched above. Rather detailed em-
pirical and conceptual work is needed to work out which semantics of conditionals
best captures the natural language conditional.
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